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The marginal man has been described as the product of simultaneous
involvement in several social worlds. Because he is both attracted
to and repelled by divergent aspects of each of these·worlds, the
marginal man is thought to be especially vulnerable to moral con-
flicts and tensions. But he is also said to possess greater human
understa~ding and broader social awareness - and for much the same
reasons.
However, if one removes the brackets from change and reinstates
them instead around the problem of order, he ought to show cause for
doing so. To put it another way, the dynamic features of marginality
To some extent perhaps, as David Riesman suggests, contemporary
. social theory misses much of the significance of marginality because
it brackets the issue of change in order to deal with the problem
of order in society. Unfortunately, Riesman argues, proponents of
this view would have us return to a "social sys tern in which everyone
was supposedly rooted, in which there wereSno marginal people .•.•
(where) everyone had a place and knew it."
Surprisingly, however, main line social theory - whether Middle
Range or broadly Systemic - tends to take a rather limited view of
the theme of marginality. Robert Merton, for example2 encapsulates
marginal men in the category of Uineligible aspirant" to social
membership in his.statement on reference group theory, while the
authors of Theories of Society deal with marginali~y as that3"deviance-prone" condition found among members of incompatible groups. No-
where in functional sociology is one likely to find the richness
and complexity conveyed by Georg Simmel, R~bert Park and E. C.
Hughes, in their essays on the same theme.
Summer, 197075K.J.S. VI, 2
Riesman's criticism seems specially cogent in view of the
pluralism which now describes Western society. What Simmel said of
the Jew and Park of the immigrant may now mark our own social
condition; mobility and urbanization have not only increased contacts
between cultures but; also have b6"0ught about fragmentation of
formerly cohesive social worlds. New identit·ies generated by "social
movements (students, Black militants, and the like~ produce sub-
cultures which then evolve their own communitites. Problems arise,
of course, but along side them one may also find the finer character-
istics of marginality: namely, "wider ~iisdom,"8"keener intelligence, II
and "the more detached and rational viewpoint." Surely it is only
if one brackets the issue of change that marginality can be reduced
to "ineligible aspirant" or "deviance-prone" behavao'r ,
may be accented provided there is some available theoretical frame-
work which relate them to plausible assertions about the relationship
between man and society. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman's state-
ment on the social dialectic is appropriate here.
Since society exists as both objective and
subjective reality, any adequate theoretical
understanding of it must comprehend both these
aspects •... (T)hese aspects receive their pro-
per recognition if society is understood in
terms of ali ongoing dialectic process composed
of the three moments of externalization, ob-
jectivation, and internalization. As far as
the societal phenomenon is concerned, these
moments are not to be thought of as occurring
in a temporal sequence. Rather society and
each part of it are simultaneously character-
ized by these three moments, so that any analy-
sis in terms Of only one or two of them falls
short. The same is true of the individual mem-
ber of society who simultaneously externalizes
his own being into the social world and internal-
izes it as an objective reality. In other words,
to Qe in s~ciety is to participate ~n its
diale.ctic.
With reference to marginality, then, the three dialectic moments
have to do with how the individual produces the conditions of his
own marginal status; and, similarly, how this marginal role ~Ooduces
the k~~d of person who can ongoingly perpetuate marginality.
Sinnnel's "Strranger ;" _for instance, imparts or projects' onto society
qualities not already part of its culture, qualities which are some-
how incorporated in the objective social structure through the on-
going involvement of the stranger. These qualities, then, serve
to create a societal condition which Hughes calls "status contra-
dictionll : namely, one which imposes on individuality ch~racteristics
not altogether wanted yet quite unescapable. This contradiciton
.entails a dilemma because what the person is defined as being is
neither wholly consistent with nor other than his self. Consequently,
he initiates a protest aginst 1;his assigned iclentity - such protes·t
being the measure of how thoroughly he has become a marginal man.
His marginality, then, sustains his role as somehow estranged from
the social order. In what follows these several ideas are looked
at more closely in the context supplied by ~immel, Park and Hughes.
GEORG SIMMEL
In S~~~~l's ess ay on "The Strranger , II' the phenomenon of mar-
g~nality is brilliantly delineated. It was to this seminal piece
76
of sociological work that Robert Park referred in his later formu-
lation of the marginal man concept. Sirome! first notes that:
If wondering is the liberation from every
given poinL in space, and thus the concep-
tual opposite to fixation at such a point,
the sociological form of the "stranger"
presents t~I unity ..• of these two charac-
tersitics. .
At the outset, therefore, the stranger expresses in appropriately
paradoxical form the ambiguity of social milieux. He is not only
the person who is present and thus somehow involved with others,
but he is also at the same time somehow independent of them.
Implied by this notion is the peculiarly sociological feature
of estrangement: The str~~~cr's distance from others is really an
affirmation of his relationship to them. In this sense, marginality
emerges as a dimension of all social relationships. This is put
with characteristic perceptiveness by Simmel:
The unity ·of naarness and remoteness in-
volved in every human relation is organized,
in the phenomenon of the stranger, in a way
which may be most briefly formulated by say-
ing that in the relationship to him, distance
means that he, who is close by, is far, and
strangeness means that he, who also is far,
is actually near. For, to be a stranger is
naturally a very positive relation; it is a
specific form of interaction.... (The
stranger f s) position is a full--fledged mem-
ber i~vol:esl~oth being outside it and con-
front~ng 1ta
In other words, the specific relevance of the stranger is that
his involvement with the group is simultaneously derivative from
his detachment. Nor is this just a bit of whimsical equivocation.
If the individual, whom we call here the stranger, were simply
a non-entity, if he did not hold a 'meaningful place inside the
group milieu, then he would not Inat t er - he would be "non-present. 11
As such, his "reality" woul.d hold none for the group , . On the
other hand, however, the s t rar ge r is there; he is present and his
presence is meaningful for the group qua group.
The operative point here has to do with the stranger's objectivity.
He is the relatively autonomous person~ So far as given societal
structures are concerned, tihe stra.nger "han no irrevocable commit-
ments. His participation is characterized by an openness to change
which militates againstl~is becoming immeraed in the ongoing defini-
tions of the situation. In other words, the stranger's involvement
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with ·the group is such that he retains some degree of separateness
from it. As Simme! points out, he is not so likely as more intimate
group members to uphold established ideologies and therefore can
take a more critical attitude toward them - particularly with reference
to group interests and values. From this position, then, the stranger
is better able to initi?te changes in the system; witness, for example,
the degree to which changes in the academic community are produced
by relatively transient and apparently estranged students rather than
more intransigent faculty or administ~ationo
Another implication of the objective nature of .the stranger's
involvement with the group. has to do with generic properties of social
relations. In the sense t.ha t the stranger embodLes some'thLng common
to all relationships, the feature of objectivi.iy if? a general one;
that is to say, there is in every web of relations, in which indi-
viduals are the subjects, a certain distant quality. More. to the
point, tile ongoLng relationships or a social group have built into
them an ay~nymity which somehow enables·individuals to retain their
autonomy. ,
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Which, of course, suggests that as a stranger the individual
can proj ect himself - his meanings - outward to the group. Since.
these meanings do not stem from the group itself, yet entail
socially relevant features, it is likely they will be appropriated
and incorporated into ongoing group life. To externalize human being,
then,implies a position somewhat outside normal social structures;
but not so far removed as to be totally detached from them. In short,
one must functign in the role of stranger if he is legitimately to
alter society. And, of course, it is always to some extent as
a stranger that the' LnddvLdua.l f Lrs t; approaches any ongoing socLal.
order; indeed, even to produce some form of .society necessarily in-
volves the coming together of individuals who are strangers to one
another.andl~ho partly remain so despite ·their joint collective
enterpr1se. .
This perhaps is why the stranger can in fact impart something
of his own to the group, and. why each can in his own way sometime
play the stranger's role. For ~xaniple, there are moments when even
one's wife discloses that she is not to be taken for granted - t'hat
she possesses qualities not reducible to the husband-wife relationship
itself. Such moments are absolutely critical to the future of the
relationship; they change it somehow. Similarly, it is only because
more opaque relationships - for example, between Blacks and Whites -
also involve modes of possible intimacy that strangers can become
spouses in the first place. Briefly, then,Simmelvs essay has something
to say about the externalization process by which human projects
become group enterprises, particularly within the context of an
ongoing societal life.
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H.OBERT EZRA PARK
Park's original essa.y on the marginal man deals with the
internalization moment in the social dialectic; the obverse to that
of externalization just imputed to Simmel's stranger. Empirically,
internalization is dramatized by the Medieval Jew - perhaps the
prototype of marginalityo
t~en, however, the walls of the medieval
ghetto were torn Jown and the Jew was
permitted to participate in the cultural
life of the peopLas amOI18 w~orn !-'c liv:d, 17
there appe~r2d"a nUY typ~ or persona11ty •..•
The upshot of this was , according to Parle, a cultural hybrid:
•.. a man living and sharing intimately in
the cu Ltura.L life and traditions of two dis-
tinct rr.~ap:~_es; never qu.Lte willing to break,
even if he \.,]~::re pe nnf.t t ed to do so, with his
p~~t and his traditions> and no quite ac-
cep t ed , 0 0 i:i.l the 1ietJ s ocf.et.y in which he now
sought to find a place. He was a man on the
margin of two cultures ••.which nevIS com-
pletely Lnt.erpene t r at.ed and fus ed ,
Similar cdr cums t ances , morcoever , l~lso confront "every inmigrant
during the period of transition." Resident in the marginal man
~s what Park calls a sense ~~ mornl dicotomy; he is, significantly,
a person who e~Bcri.en.C€"8 a parLod of inner turmoil and intense self-
consciousness.
These observatLous are important enough to unders core. The
marginal man is morally ~~bivalent because he belongs to different
social worlds each organf.zed in terms of the legitimation of different
sets of objective cultural norms and values. Allied with this one
ought not ignore Park.' s suggas t.Lve remark that "there are no doubt
periods of transition and crisis i.n the livZI of most of us that are
comparable with chese" of rhe marginal man. In other words, there
is a sense in which marginality is the consequence of involvement
in heterogeneous c:.tuations which, of course , "'·2re increasingly
characteristic of a pluralistic social order.tl.
In contrast with the role of ~trnnger, then, that of the marginal
man concerns Lntierual.Laat.Lon rather e:Kterrlalization. That is, the
marginal man maintains the societal objects originally produced by
the stranger. Or, j.n other words, stJ:'nIlgers create the conditions
of their own marginality; and it is marginality that provides the
possibility of being a stranger in socIe ty. lfuat neither Simmel nor
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Park provide, however, is an explanation of the link between
estrangement and marginality: aow does being a stranger produce
marginal men and ~~ what sense do marginal men ongoingly support
being a stranger? For this Eo C. IIughes' essays. are apposite.
E. C. HUGHES
Hughes brings together externalization and internalization in
his analysis of marginality from the standpoint of role theory. He
writes:
It is from the angle of status that I pro-
pose to analyze the phenomenon of marginality.
Status is a term of society in that it refers
specifically to a system of relations between
people. But the ~efi2!tion of the status
lies in the culture.
Hughes emphasizes what may be called the dualism of marginality -
that is to say, both its obj~ctive and subjective dimensions. 25
Objectively, marginality is the product of "status contradiction."
Status contradictions exist when individuals possess valued qualities
which ordinarily would lead, to the acquisition of certain statuses,
but are prevented from doing so because of the possession of still
other predefined characteristics. While the literature on race
relations discloses various examples of status contradiction, the
peculiar appeal of Hughes' formulation lies in hf.s attempt to discern
such objective contradictions in all social systemS. Status
contradiciton, to put it differently, represents the objectivation
of qualities imparted to ongoing society by individuals whose social
involvement unescapably is one of relative societal estrangement.
Subjectively, marginality has to do with the specific manner in
which status contradictions are experienced by the in2~vidual.
This involves what Hughes calls the IIstatus dilemma." The dilemma
consists of the individual's willingness to accept the status to
which he is consigned by society and his inability completely
to free himself from ito In other words, he discovers that his social
involvements generate a personal identity that is both intolerable
and necessary. It is intolerable because the individual is not
wholly the IItypical" person his assigned status would have him be.
However, his assigned identity is necessary because 27 is really
not wholly other than what social definitions imply.
A final point in Hughes' exposition of marginality is pertinent
here: whether marginality is limited to specific historic circum-
stances or constitutes instead an essential aspect of all social action.
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His position seems.to be perfectly cogent:
Might there not be, in the most settled so-
ciety, Pi:.::30ns who are in protest against
the roles assigned them; persons, even, w~o
want to play some role for which there is
no precedent or defined place in their cul-
ture? 0 •• 0 I do not think we know the answer
to these questions. But we have some clues.
They suggest that the human individual does
not passively accept society's answer to the
question, !~~ho am I?' with all its i~~lica­
tions of present and future conduct.
To view the individual-social theme in this way clearly points
up not only that objective structures determine subjective conscious-
ness 'but also how really impermanent these structures are - for they
ultimately depend on the individual's ongoing maintenance of them.
Because the individual remains to some extent estranged from these
structures, though he maintains them soucwhat marginally, the
likelihood of change. in or-nt.present ,
Such estrangement, furthermore~ means that the individual will
continue to project onto objective societal structures qualities not
already there. To "take ," howeve r , these qualities must be objectivated -
which is to say alien8f~~ - and thus become dehumanized. Here, then,
is the dialectic moment in which marginal men experience the dilemma
against which a protest somehow may be initiated. Despite this,
however, even the most effective protest will nonetheless produce
eventually still another set of status contradictions.
Per~aps the foregoing is best summarized in dialectic terms:
The individual approaches ongoing society as a stranger', such societal
estrangement being the result of his marginal relationship to that
society. However, as he gives more time and a t tentLon to society
(impart new meaning to it) he becomes less the stranger he was but
only to the extent that society itself becomes less foreign to him.
This, of courae , entails SOC~..A.J_ change and personal alternation both.
Social change, moreover, cnt.af Ls objective status-role contradictions
as new cultural elements are gTafted onto the old, and eventually
such contradd cd tons l:~:·Q(~UCC f.13~1~-:..;·.I,p.l rnen, Here xthe process is recurrent
as new conditions of estrangement (i.e., protest)'~·~de·V'elop. Sociologically,
then, every stranger contains within himself the seeds of his own
marginality. But rhf.s phonomenaL condition becomes accessible to the
individual on.ly through the course of its objectivation as a status
contradiction. Awareness that one is a marginal man, then, rein-
states all the opportunities for personal freedom that are charact~ristic
of being a strangero
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